Making Sense of Bangladesh’s Political Transition

May 24, 2025

There was no template for Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus when he accepted the responsibility of leading Bangladesh’s interim government following Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s August 5 abdication in the face of a mass uprising. The IG’s immediate priority was to restore a sense of order from the chaos left by the collapse of Hasina’s autocratic regime. There was also the looming threat of an economic collapse as the extent of the previous regime’s looting and mismanagement became clear. Beyond this, the IG’s raison d’etre was to create conditions for the country’s first free and fair elections since 2008. To do so, and to help prevent a return to autocratic government after elections, there was a broad consensus on the need for critical political and economic reforms. In addition, as the extent of the Hasina regime’s atrocities became clear, there was an understandable popular demand for justice and accountability, both to honor the victims and also to prevent these crimes from happening again. These tasks were made more difficult by the extent to which Bangladesh’s administration had been politicized under Hasina’s regime and institutions had been weakened.

Chief Adviser Yunus was an obvious, if initially reluctant, choice to head the interim government. As has been well publicized, he only agreed to assume this position after repeated entreaties by the students who led the mass uprising. His government consisted of highly respected individuals from across Bangladeshi society, some of whom had worked closely with Yunus before and others who were not as well known to him. From the beginning, the IG consisted of both the advisory council but also a broader coalition of the political forces who had worked together to bring down the Hasina regime—to include the students, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami, and others. The IG’s formation was widely welcomed both domestically and internationally, with the notable exception of the direct beneficiaries and patrons of the deposed Awami League—who immediately began a campaign to destabilize the country and weaken its government. Over the ensuing months, the intensity of these efforts to destabilize Bangladesh using disinformation and misinformation surprised most observers, diverting resources and forcing the IG to devote more attention to foreign relations than it might have done otherwise.

From the beginning, Yunus and his government prioritized efforts to keep together the August coalition. At times, this caused the government to take steps that appeared counterproductive, until viewed through the lens of coalition maintenance. Consensus became the order of the day, with Yunus and his team adopting a collaborative process towards governance and reforms. One consequence of this approach was the reality that it would lead to a much less ambitious set of reforms, focusing on the low-hanging fruit. The decision to adopt this approach was driven by a desire to see as much of the reform process survive past the election (unlike what happened after the 2007-08 caretaker experience and subsequent transition).

One way of thinking about Bangladesh since August 2024 is to compare it to what happens in a car race following a major accident. For a time, a pace car leads the remaining cars around the track, freezing them in their relative positions, while the wreck is cleared and until conditions allow for the race to begin again. The individual cars await the signal to resume the race and seek to improve their positions in anticipation of the future competition. In the Bangladesh analogy, Hasina caused the crash and the Awami League car is no longer in the race. Chief Advisor Yunus and the IG are in the role of the pace car, while the other political parties are jockeying for position to resume the race. All share an interest in avoiding another crash even as they think about their future prospects.

With the tenure of the IG nearing its end, whether that be in late 2025 or the first part of 2026, the other members of the August coalition are understandably trying to improve their prospects for electoral victory. As the odds-on favorite, the BNP has both the most to gain as well as the most to lose and is the most anxious for the race to start. For its part, the BJI appears focused more on its medium-term prospects and sees the value in keeping together the August coalition as long as possible. The students, who have since formed a new political party even as some key members remain in the IG cabinet, appear to understand that they are not likely to win elections in the short term but have the greatest interest in ensuring that Bangladesh’s politics do not return to business as usual. Meanwhile, those on the periphery of the political process, to include the bureaucracy, the army, the business community, civil society and the international community are each making their own calculations based on maximizing their interests.

With this as background, it is easier to understand the dynamics at play behind Bangladesh’s most recent political crisis, which included threats by CA Yunus and his government to resign. The driving force behind this crisis has been the BNP’s ambition to accelerate the election timeline while minimizing the extent of reforms prior to the transition. This is understandable as the BNP would not want to begin its tenure constrained by reforms imposed by others and would want to gain the political credit for any subsequent reform efforts. Ironically, the BNP’s program of accelerated elections and minimal reforms finds it aligned with its archrival Awami League and its backers in India. The recent intervention by Bangladesh’s Army Chief finds him aligned with this same approach. This has been met with a strong response from the students and others who fear that this approach will lead to a return to business-as-usual following elections.

As the political crisis continues, there are broadly three possible outcomes. The first extreme would be for Yunus and his government to follow through on threats to resign. This would likely lead to the formation of a more traditional caretaker government which would hold elections within 90 days. At the other extreme, the IG could force a showdown with the BNP and its backers, to test whether the party’s support is greater than that which could be mustered by the students and others within society. The most likely outcome, in my view, is that this crisis will prompt frank discussions between the members of the August coalition in which they can come to consensus on a path forward—a minimal reform package that leads to elections and a transition by early 2026. For this to happen, all members of the coalition need to engage with a view towards putting the nation’s interest above partisan concerns, recognizing that the alternative would only play into the hands of Hasina and her allies.

Jon Danilowicz

Jon Danilowicz is a retired Department of State Senior Foreign Service Officer with extensive experience in South Asia. During his career, Jon provided leadership at some of America’s most dangerous and challenging diplomatic posts. His career highlights include service as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassies in Dhaka, Bangladesh and Juba, South Sudan and as Principal Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Peshawar, Pakistan.