Jon DanilowiczIn the before times, I provided examples of the “elevator speeches” I would have given to former Bangladesh Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia and their colleagues in the run up to the January 2024 elections. In the same spirit, I have been thinking about what advice I would give to Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus and his Cabinet if I happened to have a few minutes alone with them on an elevator as they take on their new responsibilities. My sense is that the best I could do is highlight some of the most critical mistakes that the 2007-08 Caretaker Government made which undermined their efforts to reform Bangladesh’s political system. Embedded in this is an acknowledgement of the mistakes that the U.S. and other international actors made during the same period. While each of these topics deserves a longer treatment, the nature of an elevator speech is to focus on the high points. In the interest of full disclosure, I offer this advice in the hope that it might help Professor Yunus and his government succeed in grasping this historic opportunity to set Bangladesh on a more promising future path.
First and foremost, my advice to the civilian interim government would be to assert their supremacy over Bangladesh’s military. If this proves impossible, then it is best that they step down rather than provide a façade behind which the military could again attempt to rule. During the 2007-08 period, nobody in Bangladesh or abroad actually believed that Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed or his colleagues were calling the shots. While some of the Advisers played supporting roles in that administration, in the end decisions were made by the Army Chief and a small circle of uniformed subordinates (who often provided him with conflicting advice). This is not to say that the military has no role in the current scenario. Rather, the military must be subordinate to the civilian government and play a supporting role—acting when and if requested by their civilian superiors.
As part of the hybrid government between 2007-08, responsibility for key components of the reform agenda (including the anti-corruption drive and political party reform) was given to a couple of Brigadiers in military intelligence. This resulted in the notorious “minus two” policy, which failed even as it outed and ultimately weakened those within the parties who were most interested in reform. Despite the confidence with which they both approached their tasks, in the end these Brigadiers were outmaneuvered by much craftier politicians. More generally, the 2007-08 hybrid caretaker regime never had a clear sense of its priorities and was easily distracted. For most of its tenure the civilian side of the house was understaffed and under resourced, which only contributed to the dominant role played by the military. The international community also did not do enough to support the civilian side of the government.
The 2007-08 government repeatedly insisted that it was not “political.” This reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of how government works. While the caretaker regime was not partisan (in traditional Bangladeshi terms), by its very nature any government is political. Again, the caretaker government was never able to find a way to fulfill the role that sidelined politicians had played in serving as a transmission belt between citizens and their government. It was not sufficient to rely on bureaucrats or junior army officers to step into the role that had been traditionally played by politicians.
With regard to international affairs, the naturally introverted Chief Adviser was as reluctant to engage with foreign officials as he was to interact with his own citizens. While the 2007-08 government had an experienced hand responsible for Foreign Affairs, a lack of diplomatic engagement from the very top (at times because of protocol concerns) hampered the international community’s ability to understand or assist the caretaker regime. By contrast, the Army Chief was much more accessible and reinforced the impression that he was the man to see.
Since the elevator must be reaching its destination by now, I will end on perhaps the most important point–so it sticks in the mind of the listener. The 2007-08 government made a grave error by setting an arbitrary deadline for the end of the interregnum. Rather than focus on a flexible conditions-based timetable, that government announced its expiration date, with the encouragement of the international community. Once this happened, the response from the spoilers in the political class was preordained. They realized that leverage had been transferred from the government to the unreformed political class which knew it only had to pay lip service to demands for change.
As the elevator door opens, my parting advice to the new government would be to be prepared for the unexpected. Just as Sheikh Hasina never would have predicted the spark that ultimately let the fuse that ended her regime, all governments must deal with contingency. The 2007-08 government was dealt a lousy hand when global food and energy prices spiked and when an umbrella at a sporting match led to student protests. There is little happening in the world today that would indicate that the coming months and years will be any more stable than the recent past.
