Dr. Sreeradha DattaThe 5th August 2024, noon ushered in dramatic changes in the Bangladesh polity, with former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, leader of Awami League (AL), having to hurriedly leave Bangladesh, for India. While this dramatic turn of events had consequences in the region and outside, however the most affected was India, its immediate neighbour.
Bangladesh witnesseds a largely organic and peaceful student movement for reforms of the quota system from July this year, against a High Court ruling that restored the 30 percent reservation for Liberation War families. The state’s violent and brutal response, led to political parties and a wide cross section of the civil society joining this movement. The continued government’s obduracy and lack of dialogue between Hasina and the protestors prompted the demand for removal of the prime minister. To avoid the wrath of the public anger and resentment, Hasina exited for India, where she has continued to remain ever since. While this will be the second time she has taken refuge in India, the circumstances and the stakes this time around are obviously different for India and her as well.
An Interim Government (IG) led by Nobel laureate Prof M Yunus, along with 19 advisers, has been in place in Dhaka since 8 August. However, in the immediate aftermath the polity moved towards another phase of disorder. Beginning with the overrun of Gono Bhavan (the prime minister’s official residence) and destruction of National icon Bangabandhu Mujibur Rahman’s statues, house and museums, the nation has witnessed outburst of violence, vandalism, attacks on minorities, burning and death including in the Chittagong Hill Tracts area recently. The acts of retribution visible through the mindless political arrests and fear persecution in the aftermath has been disconcerting. The last three months there seems a distinct trend of using violence as a tool for change, which clearly negates the very idea of the reform movement that ushered in such dramatic political changes.
For India, apprehension centers around the uncertainty of the immediate future and the apparent inability of the interim government to control the acts of dichotomous non-state actors.
Secondly, India has historically enjoyed friendly ties with AL and Hasina’s continued term lent India with comfort and flexibility hitherto unparalleled. The breakdown of AL government points to a distinct Indian oversight that it is finding difficult to accept, internalize or even justify.
Thirdly, India is questioning the legitimacy of the IG, as the earlier caretaker government was removed by Hasina through the 15th amendment and there exists no provision for an IG.
Fourthly, the previous experience of any non-Awami League government namely that with the other larger political party, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (2001-2006), and indelible memories of cross border terror attacks and heightened security issues for India remains. And despite some smattering of official contact with some of the BNP leadership, it remains tenuous and has not led to any trust building.
Fifthly, the sudden prominence of Islamists in public space and many of them being allowed to come out of imprisonment has been perceived as a possible Islamist take over.
Sixthly the question over the Army’s political ambition remains unanswered and there continues a underlying concern whether any non -AL government may be stable and democratic.
The first high level meeting between the foreign ministers took place during the last week of September, emanating right sounds but without any specific future commitment. Understandably it will take a bit to thaw the bilateral mood as tempers have been frayed on both sides. India is also wary of the interim government’s efforts to establish closer ties with Pakistan and the mention of the revival of SAARC is perceived as IG’s insensitivity to Indian positions. Similarly, India’s recent caustic comments about Bangladesh in general in recent times and has not given an impression of being taken in with the popular movement and its consequences.
While Dhaka is likely to request for Hasina’s extradition, there is likely an all-Indian party consensus about Sheikh Hasina’s refuge in India. This issue may be disconcerting for the interim government and the subsequent elected government, but both sides will have to work out a Modus Vivendi to let this issue not derail their future ties. Given the history there exists a certain section in Bangladesh who also have reservation about engaging with India, but cursory ties are not an option for the neighbours as much is at stake for both. Putting the past behind and sustaining the bilateral projects and connectivity corridors that has been beneficial to people continue is the minimum that should be on the table.
In the absence of any distinct bilateral initiatives or planned meetings, speculations have given way to an outburst of deliberate campaign of misinformation on both sides of the border. Bangladesh social media has tried to rundown India and its pro Awami league support, while Indian social media has been comparing Bangladesh going the Afghanistan way and imminent take over of the Islamists groups. In the public domain there seems to be exaggerated positions, and while this is reflective of only a minor section of the society in India and Bangladesh, the danger of this narratives driving the public discourse in different direction may not be unexpected. The electoral victory of Donald Trump to return to Washington in 2025 has also encouraged many outlandish assumptions from presumably Awami League loyalists to pitch about return of Sheikh Hasina to Dhaka as a political contender. While this may not be even a remote possibility, the value of rhetoric cannot be over emphasized. The question over the irrelevant issue of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s resignation is clearly distracting and not really helping the bilateral ties.
The present impasse between India and Bangladesh ought to be a temporary phase and the earlier the phase is overcome both sides will benefit mutually. The importance of bilateral engagement cannot be overstressed, and an assurance from IG that they are cognizant of Indian security concerns and India conveying that Bangladesh remains not only a critical bilateral neighbour but also an essential partner for its larger regional aspirations will set the tone right for India and Bangladesh. The two neighbors can choose to find faults with each other or can allow political dexterity to lead the way forward. Indubitably India and Bangladesh destinies are intertwined, pursuing any other trajectory would be a wasteful exercise.
