Nazmus SakibWhen Sheikh Hasina visited Beijing in July 2024, little did she know that within a month she would have to resign, fleeing on a helicopter on August 5th or—as Dhaka Street calls it—July 36th.
In May, just a few months before Hasina’s visit, Bangladesh held its first-ever joint military exercises with China.
Earlier, when she rigged yet another election, in January, the Chinese and Russian ambassadors were among the first to arrive at Hasina’s residence to congratulate her.
What international observers everywhere else saw as proof of flagrant election rigging and democratic backsliding, what even domestic pro-Awami League intellectuals had a hard time defending, Chinese analysts often viewed as outstanding political achievements–, creating the first string of four consecutive re-elections (2008, 2014, 2018, 2024) since Bangladesh’s independence.
In the Chinese view, the economic “success” of the Sheikh Hasina regime wais inseparable from correlates such as “political stability” and cooperation with China in the forms of investments, giga infrastructure projects, and bilateral trade collectively valued at over $25 billion, only second to Pakistan in the region.
Fearing that July 36th was a “color revolution”, Chinese commentators have been suspicious of the “frequent” high-level meetings between the US and Bangladesh since and promises of financial assistance in what Chinese intelligentsia deem as “shaping Bangladesh”.
The view from Beijing is that recent “sudden changes” in Bangladesh’s political landscape are not only the product of its domestic party politics but also an artifact of the international geopolitical game.
Amidst the shock of recent changes, only the United States swiftly took decisive action, leveraging bilateral and multilateral channels to endorse the Bangladesh interim government’s reform agenda.
Chinese policy circles believe that the US actively worked to reshape Bangladesh’s political, economic, and social landscape, aiming to create a more compliant partner aligned with Western values.
Bangladesh under Hasina was a priority industrial investment destination and an exemplary engineering landmark for China. China has been Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and largest source of imports for 13 consecutive years.
China is also a main source of foreign direct investment in Bangladesh.
Under Hasina, China has become the biggest supplier of arms to Bangladesh and Dhaka has become the second-biggest buyer of Chinese weapons.
After the July uprisings, as Dhaka becomes conscious of its sovereign existence as an independent political community distinct from New Delhi’s sphere of influence, it will most likely feel the urgency to modernize its military arsenal.
If past trends offer a reliable signal, Chinese-Bangladesh military cooperation is largely driven by expediency, characterized by deregulated, swift deals, cheaper pricing, favorable terms, and the Bangladeshi military’s long-standing familiarity with Chinese weapons.
China thus might still be the naturally plausible jugular vein of this military modernization.
New Delhi (i—Beijing’s nemesis in the String of Pearls game plan) —would surely pat itself on the back if it had half the hard power of China in Bangladesh. And yet India exerts tremendous soft power over the cultural landscape of Bangladesh, despite being despised by the masses as being the chief patron of the Hasina regime.
It was New Delhi, not Beijing, that lobbied for Hasina in Western capitals.
Neither did Beijing provide intelligence and other forms of aid to Dhaka under Hasina while she ran a political witch hunt for 15 years against all forms of dissent.
India, despite lacking substantial hard power comparable to China, has deeply penetrated Bangladesh’s cultural sphere, shaping narratives and influencing prominent intellectuals and institutions through strategic funding and partnerships.
The Indian embassy’s sponsorship of cultural programs, film productions, and advertisement sponsorships to most circulated Bengali and English daily newspapers , and artistic organizations creates a steady flow of financial support to influential cultural figures and establishments, especially those advocating themes like “spirit of ‘71. By funding these initiatives, India exerts its soft power and embeds its political narrative within Bangladesh’s cultural framework, aligning local discourse with Indian geopolitical interests.
Key cultural figures, often leaders in poetry, music, film, and the arts, are seen embracing and promoting these narratives, normalizing an Indian-backed metapolitical stance in Bangladesh’s public sphere.
This calculated investment creates a soft power foothold in the country, and the broader public discourse in Bangladesh begins to reflect India’s influence.
China, on the other hand, despite its strong hard power presence, lacks soft power anywhere near that of India.
China does not possess a soft power apparatus comparable to India’s or even that of the French or German embassies and their affiliated cultural organizations.
In the battle of narratives, all of China’s hard power and wealth rarely translate to influence in its favor.
While Pakistan has Chinese Qawwali bands and Dhaka-based media groups like the parent company of Prothom Alo have signed formal cooperation agreements with the Indian government, any such cooperation between any Chinese and Bangladeshi cultural or media institutions is not noticeable.
Efforts like Chinese President Xi’s letter to a Bangladeshi girl failed to generate soft power for China because its development model prioritizes military and infrastructure investments without building complementary soft power structures.
This lack of “soft superstructures” leaves China’s hard power initiatives unsupported and vulnerable.
China has hitherto failed to create a shared dream that resonates with an average Bangladeshi young woman or man today.
Bangladesh might rely on China for arms, capital, engineering, and technology but this transactional relationship lacks emotional or cultural resonance with the public.
